Qatar Operational Impact Report January 2021

It is now possible to travel directly between all GCC countries meaning that a western business traveller, visiting both Doha and Abu Dhabi, for example, will be able to make the journey in 45 minutes, as opposed to the 3+ hours which were required before for transiting through Kuwait or Oman.

Despite the opening of land, sea and air borders between Qatar and its neighbours, due to the strict quarantine currently in place in Qatar and the requirement for a non-resident or citizen to obtain an Exceptional Entry Permit (EEP) prior to travel, there is unlikely to be a significant increase in traffic between Qatar and its neighbours in the near future.

Longer-term, the consequences of the ending of the blockade are more opaque. Given how effectively all ties were severed in June 2017 it will take time for any semblance of the previous situation to return, not least because of the deep mistrust which the event will have generated.

Economically, Qatar will benefit from the return of Saudi tourists who provided a lot of business to Qatari hotels. The ability of Saudis to travel to Qatar must now be factored into considerations for World Cup 2022 since this will mean extra strain on the already stretched accommodation options.

In terms of a wider economic impact, effective alternative supply chains for goods and materials have been established via Iran, Turkey, Kuwait and Oman, and Qatar has even become self-sufficient in certain areas of agriculture. There will be a certain reluctance to relinquish these links unless there is a highly compelling economic case for returning to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Given the speed with which the 2017 blockade was imposed, there is no guarantee that a similar event cannot happen in the future. At the onset of the blockade, Qatar was presented with a 13-point list of demands to which it was supposed to agree within 10 days. With the signing of the Al-Ula Declaration, all of these demands have been dropped. This means that although the most recent development may be seen as a significant diplomatic victory for Qatar, the casus belli of the original blockade remains unresolved.

The high-profile killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh has the potential to be a destabilising event in the region. Given the modus operandi of the operation itself and the choice of target, it is highly likely that the killing was an Israeli-led operation with tacit approval from the US. It is moderately likely that the operation was given explicit US approval and operational support in the form of intelligence and logistics.

The assassination needs to be viewed against the backdrop of the US presidential election and the wider moves in the region to develop an alignment of powers against Iranian influence. Whilst the killing of Fakhrizadeh is unlikely to have a tangible effect on Iran’s physical ability to develop nuclear weapons, it may have other effects. In terms of the US presidential election, the assassination was likely intended to minimise the chance of a resurrection of the JCPOA (commonly known as the ‘Iran Nuclear Deal’) under the Biden administration by prompting an angry reaction from Iran, be it a military or asymmetric retaliation or other measures. There is already an example of this with the passing on 01 December, 2020 of a bill by the Iranian parliament requiring the Iranian government to suspend nuclear inspections unless sanctions are lifted.

Whilst this bill will not change Iranian nuclear policy, which is set by the Supreme National Security Council, it may serve as a domestic constraint on future negotiations with US administrations.

The attack on a fuel transport ship in the port of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 14 December may be viewed as an Iranian response to the strike on Fahkrizadeh. This attack likely originated from the Houthis in Yemen, a known Iranian proxy, and the modus operandi of targeting shipping related to the oil industry is well used by Iran. The Jeddah attack would be intended to demonstrate Iranian reach, since the city is so far from both Iran and Yemen, and in that sense it is a reciprocal response to the attack on Fahkrizadeh which took place in Absard, in the heart of Iran.

A significant barrage of at least 21 rockets was launched against the US Embassy in Baghdad on 23 December. This represents the largest such attack since 2010 although it resulted in no US casualties. It is likely that the attack originated from an Iranian-backed militia. The US has sought to downplay the incident, at first reporting only 8 rockets fired which suggests an attempt to deescalate the situation.

This incident, viewed alongside the Jeddah attack, provide further evidence of Iran’s preferred modus operandi for asserting itself: the use of proxy forces as opposed to its own uniformed military.

On 04 January 2021, Iran seized a South Korean flagged tanker citing concerns over ‘environmental pollution.’ The move is likely to be an attempt to pressure South Korea to release over $7Bn of assets frozen in South Korean banks. This action demonstrates another ongoing Iranian modus operandi which is to exploit the vulnerability of vessels transiting the Straits of Hormuz to achieve political goals.

Despite the inflammatory nature of the killing and the Iranian response, the chances of the incident triggering a regional conflict remain LOW. Iran knows that it must restrain its impulse to retaliate if it is to have any chance of resurrecting the JCPOA under the next administration. Furthermore, it is likely that both the killing of Qassem Soleimani on 03 Jan and the recent killing of Fakhrizadeh will have had a strong deterrent effect on the decision-making of Iran’s senior leadership since it is clear that even their most high-profile personnel are vulnerable.

The Abraham Accords which were signed on 15 September normalise relations between Israel and UAE and Israel and Bahrain. It should also be remembered that although it was not a signatory, Saudi Arabia has tacitly approved these accords and have even opened their airspace to flights travelling between Israel and the UAE. Importantly, the accords contain no reference to the conditionality of a Palestinian state.

The Abraham Accords may be viewed as part of Israel’s wider regional strategy to develop a bloc amongst Sunni Muslim states to counteract the ‘Shia crescent’ which is arguably in the ascendant.

In spite of the accords, Qatar is keen to maintain its neutrality in the region. One of the main consequences of the 2017 blockade was the warming of the relationship between Qatar and Iran. This relationship continues to contribute to the mistrust between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours.

Qatar also continues continued strong support for the Palestinian cause. This was most in evidence in the Amir of Qatar’s speech at the opening of the 49th Shura Council Session where he reaffirmed Qatar’s position on the Palestinian question:

“Concerning our region, we reaffirm our steadfast position regarding the just Palestinian cause and the legitimate rights of our Palestinian brothers, including the establishment of their independent state on the basis of 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a just solution to the refugee issue, under international legitimacy resolutions.”

It is likely that this rhetoric was intended be perceived as a contrast to the regional trend of normalising relations with Israel.

Furthermore, HH Sheikh Tamim met with the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas at the Amiri Diwan on 14 December and reaffirmed his commitment to Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Violations of Qatari airspace by Bahraini military aircraft are infrequent but occur on an annual basis. Given the ongoing Exercise EPIC SKIES, a joint training package between the RAF and Qatari Emiri Air Force, we assess this violation to be a direct response and may even be viewed as a type of limited ‘reconnaissance in force’.

Qatar’s winning of the 2030 Asian Games whilst a diplomatic coup for the country, will have done little to improve relations with its neighbours, particularly given that the key rival bid was from Riyadh, which lost with 10 votes to Doha’s 27 in the ballot held in Oman on 16 December.

The risk of regional conflict remains a distant one but it is elevated from INSIGNIFICANT to LOW based on our assessment methodology.