Qatar Operational Impact Report February 2021

In Doha, the Saudi and Egyptian flags are already flying over the reopened embassies. Relations with blockading states will be slow to recover: most tension will remain between Qatar and Bahrain, predominantly driven by the ongoing territorial dispute over the Hawar Islands west of Qatar. Although the dispute was resolved diplomatically in 2001, Bahraini fishing vessels stray regularly into Qatari waters because of the greater abundance of fish. Furthermore, as time passes, it becomes increasingly clear that Bahrain has suffered a net loss of access to natural resources – including fishing stocks and hydrocarbons – in the waters awarded to Qatar as compensation during the 2001 agreement.

Another key development for Qatar during the reporting period has been the inauguration of new US president Joe Biden, and the announcement of his administration. A number of President Biden’s senior advisors in have experience of the region, including Daniel Benaim, who will be Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arabian Peninsula Affairs, and Barbara Leaf, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs. Significantly, Leaf was US Ambassador to UAE until 2018: the new appointees herald a nuanced approach to Gulf politics which will recognise the complex role played by Qatar, in particular its position as mediator. One example of this is how Qatar has been funding Hamas in Gaza in coordination with the Israeli government in order to avoid the takeover of more radical elements.

The new approach adopted by the Biden administration could see Qatar brought more into a Western orbit, in-line with other Gulf States. This in turn could have an effect on how major tenders related to large future projects such as the North Field Expansion (NFE) are awarded, since Qatar may be more inclined to involve US businesses.

Regional tensions with Iran have continued to result in low-level military action during the reporting period. On 15 February, 2021, fourteen rockets were launched against a US military base near Erbil International Airport, resulting in the death of a US contractor, and an Iraqi civilian in Erbil. Guardians of the Blood Brigade, a Shiite militia with links to Iran, claimed responsibility for the attack.

On 26 February, 2021, President Biden authorised airstrikes against Iranian-backed militias in Syria, which resulted in the deaths of several fighters at a facility in Al Bukamal, close to the Iraqi border. On 03 March, 2021, at least ten rockets were fired at Ain Al Asad Air Force Base (Anbar Province) which hosts US and coalition forces, killing one US contractor. Although no one has claimed responsibility for the attack, the timing of the incident, the tactics used, and the fact that Ain Al Asad has been targeted by Iran before, suggests at the very least that an Iranian proxy was responsible.

This current round of attacks may be seen as an attempt by Iran to calibrate the responses of the new US administration to better understand their policy in the region. The attacks may also be interpreted as a coercive attempt to press an advantage and resurrect the JCPOA, following South Korea’s announcement on 24 February that it would release US$1BN of Iranian assets, a move which required at least tacit US approval.

On 26 February, 2021, a series of explosions damaged an Israeli-owned vehicle carrier ship, MV Helios Ray, in the Gulf of Oman. Although no one has claimed responsibility, the modus operandi of suggests Iran was responsible: similar attacks in the Gulf of Oman were executed by Iran in June of 2019. Significantly, the MV Helios Ray was travelling from the port of Dammam, Saudi Arabia, to Singapore: if the explosions were caused by limpet-type magnetic mines, these could have been attached in Dammam itself. This would demonstrate Iranian reach throughout the Gulf, and reminding all the Gulf States and their allies that they are vulnerable to similar attacks. The timing of the attack, just after the announcement of the unfreezing of Iranian assets by South Korea, also supports the theory, discussed in previous Reports, that Tehran sees attempted rapprochement by the west as a sign that their campaign is bearing fruit.